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Abstract
Foreign partner ﬁrms’ (FPs’) superior intangible assets such as technology and marketing and
other management skill are an integral source of their bargaining power in their negotiations with
potential joint venture partners (JPs) and government regulators in the host country. FPs which can
exercise high levels of bargaining power enter the host country market with either a fully owned
subsidiary (SUB) or an international joint venture (IJV) with larger ownership shares than otherwise.
Inthispaper,wepresentsuchabargainingpowermodel.Wethenestimatethemodelusingdatafor
jointventuresinJapanforthepost-WorldWarIIhistoricalperiod.Ourresultsaregenerallyconsistent
with the model predictions. We then consider a dynamic context where JPs’ learning from their own
IJVsaswellastheincreasingR&DcapacityoftheirindustrywillenhanceJPs’bargainingpower.Such
learning by JPs, together with other factors, could undermine FPs’ ownership of the IJV over time.
Generally, changes over time in the positions, for example, of FPs’ and JPs’ intangible assets such as
technology can signiﬁcantly affect their relative bargaining power and hence affect their ownership
shares in their IJVs. Our empirical results also conﬁrm such learning effects on the part of the JP.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The dynamic evolution of international joint ventures (IJVs) has attracted much interest
in the literature. There is considerable research interest in exploring the impact IJVs might
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E-mail address: masao.nakamura@sauder.ubc.ca.have on the future course of their parent ﬁrms as well as the outcomes for the IJVs
themselves. For example, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that, regardless of
the reasons that prompted two ﬁrms to form an IJV, the likelihood that this IJV will be
stable and long-lasting versus abandoned or bought out depends crucially on the types of
interactions the respective parent ﬁrms have with the IJV over time (Nakamura, Shaver, &
Yeung, 1996).
Bleeke and Ernst (1995) stress the importance of ﬁrms’ incorporating in their decision
processes of alliances the potential consequences over time of the proposed alliances.
Abegglen and Stalk (1985, p. 229) provide examples of the subsequent buyouts by one of
the partners of foreign ﬁrms’ joint ventures with Japanese partners. These studies suggest
that, even though future events are not fully predictable, ﬁrm management could apply the
concepts, for example, underlying our bargaining model discussed below for simulating
the sorts of consequences that might occur over time for the joint ventures (or more
broadly alliances) being proposed. For example, the local partner’s capacity to learn the
relevant technologies that drive the joint venture being proposed will likely enhance the
relative bargaining power of the local partner and increase the probability of their buyout
of the joint venture. On the other hand, the foreign partner’s ability and willingness to
learn management skills in local production, marketing and distribution might eventually
result in increased bargaining power of the foreign partner, making it unnecessary for them
to maintain the joint venture. In such a case the buyout of the joint venture by the foreign
partner might follow.
Interactions between the partner ﬁrms are an important factor in the determination of
their IJVs’ future course. Suppose, for example, that a foreign ﬁrm with a new technology-
based product sets up an IJV in a host country with a domestic ﬁrm with superb marketing
capabilities. The IJV works well for the ﬁrst few years, receiving complementary inputs
from its parent ﬁrms. As the parent ﬁrms learn more about their respective IJV partners
through interactions involving IJV operations, the foreign parent may come to feel it has
accumulated enough knowledge about the domestic (host country) market, and the host
country parent may also feel it has absorbed enough manufacturing knowledge of the
products the IJV is producing. If the parent ﬁrms still see value in the division of labor
based on the competence of the respective partners, the IJV will continue and may ﬂourish
over time. On the other hand if at least one partner thinks it has learned enough about the
skill it was lacking at the outset of the IJV, the IJV will likely cease to exist. The parent
ﬁrms’ unique alliance experience trajectories also affect the nature and likelihood of the
various possible ex post-adjustments in these sorts of alliance partnerships (Reuer, Zollo,
& Singh, 2002).
1
The dynamic evolution of IJVs and other types of alliances has been studied by many
other authors as well. For example, termination patterns for IJVs were studied by
Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996), Barkema and Vermeulen (1997), Kogut (1989,
1991), and Park and Ungson (1997). Joint ventures and other types of alliances are also
1 Gleister, Husan, and Buckley (2003) show that the major management lessons learned by IJV experienced
partners and managers can be classiﬁed into the following three distinct groups: (1) management of the IJV
formation processes; (2) management of the boundary relationships between partners; and (3) management of the
operation of the IJV.
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arrangements are not always long-lasting.
2
One of the essential factors that these studies suggest as determining the evolution of
IJVs is inter-organizational learning by ﬁrms. As the above example illustrates, learning
from joint ventures could impact not only the fate of the IJVs that the parent ﬁrms have
created but also the possible strategic alternatives the parent ﬁrms themselves face over
time (e.g. Demirbag & Mirza, 2000). There has been, however, relatively little research in
the literature that relates learning and other evolutionary processes of the kinds discussed
above to models of foreign direct investment (FDI) explicitly. This paper addresses this
issue.
In this paper, we use a bargaining model as a basic model of FDI and consider the
process that describes how learning and other dynamic events may alter the relative
bargaining power of the partners over time. Such a change in the relative power positions
of the IJV partners often result in reorganization of the IJV ownership, leading to
instability of IJVs.
The objective of our research is to provide information which is potentially useful for
parent ﬁrms in designing their strategies on ownership of their foreign operations.
Understanding essential factors which inﬂuence the future course of the ownership
structures of their foreign operations wouldhelp the ﬁrms, for example, to decide how long
particular IJVs should exist as joint ventures before they should be reorganized as their
fully owned subsidiaries.
3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple
bargaining model which describes how the parent ﬁrms of an IJV involving R&D and
other intangible assets with possible spillovers (i.e. learning) determine their ownership
shares in the IJV. Practical measurement issues of ﬁrms’ intangible assets such as R&D
and management skills are also discussed in this section.
4 We also discuss the properties of
the model within a static single-period framework. In Section 3, we present empirical
results supporting the bargaining model. In Section 4, we present empirical evidence that
local partner ﬁrms learn from their IJVs. Some simulation experiments on how parent
ﬁrms’ optimal ownership shares in their IJVs evolve over time in response to changes in
various factors are also presented in this section. Section 5 concludes.
2 Levenstein and Suslow (2004, Table 1) ﬁnd that many international cartels last for less than 6 years while a
few last for much longer.
3 Foreign operations’ performance and their ownership structures are often found to be correlated (e.g. Killing,
1982; Ramaswamya, Gomesb, & Veliyathc, 1998). Most strategic alliances, which may or may not be set up as
joint ventures, are dissolved as soon as their parent ﬁrms’ objectives have been achieved. The times of such
dissolutions are not often pre-determined and hence stochastic. Many IJVs share the same property as these
strategic alliances.
4 In this paper, we use intangible assets to mean non-physical assets which broadly include R&D, management
skill and other knowledge-based assets as well as more traditional (in accounting sense) good will. In empirical
implementation of our model to follow we focus on R&D (technology) as the primary intangible assets.
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One of the main decisions facing a ﬁrm considering FDI is that of the ownership
structure for its foreign subsidiary: should it be a fully owned subsidiary, or should it be a
joint venture with a ﬁrm in the host country? In case of a joint venture, how much
ownership should the foreign parent ﬁrm have inthe joint venture? The alternative theories
of FDI cited above do not generally provide predictions about the ownership structure for
ﬁrms’ FDI.
Yet the ownership structure for a foreign subsidiary is particularly important for
technology-based manufacturing ﬁrms whose competitive edge primarily comes from
intangible assets such as engineering and scientiﬁc knowledge, production skills and
know-how, and brand names. These intangible assets may also reﬂect product quality,
marketing and other management techniques. The integrity of ownership of technology-
based ﬁrms’ intellectual property rights is often difﬁcult to secure even under legal
contracts when other ﬁrms are allowed to exercise such rights. In particular, it is generally
difﬁcult for a foreign ﬁrm to write a legal contract with a local joint-venture partner ﬁrm
which speciﬁes precisely the way in which a particular intangible asset is to be used in the
joint-venture. For example, a licensing agreement which allows a joint venture to use its
foreign parent ﬁrm’s technology may not protect the licensor’s property rights very well
since the licensee might use the licensed technology for products other than the ones
speciﬁed in the agreement. The joint venture partner may also obtain essential information
related to the licensed technology from the joint venture.
Such a problem of skill spillover will likely be reduced if the provider of intangible
skills owns substantial equity in the operations utilizing such skills. As pointed out by
Grossman and Hart (1986), the ownership of an asset includes not only the entitlement to
the return stream resulting from the use of the asset, but also the residual rights of control
over all aspects of the use of the asset except those rights which are explicitly contracted
away. In this sense, equity participation in a direct investment plays an essential role in
technology-based ﬁrms’ expansions into foreign markets where potential competitors also
do business.
Two types of direct investment, fully owned and jointly owned subsidiaries, have
different implications for the diffusion of a foreign parent ﬁrm’s technology. While a fully
owned subsidiary can keep the foreign parent ﬁrm’s loss due to unauthorized use of its
intangible assets to a minimum, the foreign parent ﬁrm (FP) might not be able to reap fully
the return that its intangible assets could potentially earn. This may occur, for example, if
FP or its 100% subsidiary, is not familiar with local production inputs and distribution and
marketing practices. The geographical distance between FP and its fully owned subsidiary
in a host country also increases FP’s cost of agency (monitoring) (see Brickley & Dark,
1989 for empirical evidence that franchising is associated with the distance, a source of
agency (monitoring) cost, between the owner of an intangible asset (e.g. brand name,
reputation) and the site of business operation using the intangible asset.)
A joint-venture partner (JP) in a host country may be able to provide management skills
which, combined with FP’s technology, could fully utilize the potential of the technology.
On the other hand, JP may take advantage of the joint venture with FP as a learning
experience for developing its own future technology. Nakamura and Yeung (1994) present
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(JV) in which FP, the dominant provider of intangible skills to JV, chooses its ownership
share in JV by balancing the marginal beneﬁt (intrinsic proﬁt) it receives from JV against
the marginal cost of control (agency cost and technology spillover). In this model JP plays
no role in the determination of its ownership share in JV. While there is some anecdotal
evidence that ownership shares insome joint ventures are indeed determined in the manner
assumed in Nakamura and Yeung (1994), their model does not consider the potential
bargaining processes that may take place between FP and JP.
2.1. Firms’ intangible assets and FDI
The concept of intangible assets is of wide use in both academic research and business
practices of management and various methods of measurement of intangible assets are
implemented in practice.
Many previous studies have identiﬁed various forms of intangible assets as the driving
force ofﬁrms’ international expansion (e.g. Arora & Fosfuri, 2000; Balakrishnan & Koza,
1993; Hymer, 1960; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Teece, 1977; Von Hippel, 1994). A recent
study of the Commission of the European Communities (Zambon, 2003) stresses the shift
of corporate decision making emphasis from tangible to intangible assets and focuses on
the measurement issues of intangible assets. Firms’ intangible assets are typically assumed
to consist of knowledge capital reﬂected in R&D and marketing/advertising skills,
production and inventory control (e.g. JIT) skills, supplier management skills, patents and
unpatented technology, good will and other types of management skills.
5 Evidence of
technology spillover from foreign direct investment (e.g. Bernstein, 2000; Liu, Siler,
Wand, & Wei, 2000; Spencer, 2000) also implies the managerial importance ofﬁrms’ skill
to protect their own technologies.
Some empirical estimates of technology spillover and related returns are also available
(e.g. Bernstein, 2000; Bernstein & Mohnen, 1998; European Commission, 2001; Grifﬁth,
Redding, & Van Reenen, 2001; Luintel & Kahn, 2002). Abegglen and Stalk (1985, pp.
126–128) also describe their numerical estimates for the amount of technology spillover
experienced by US ﬁrms as follows: the cumulative cost of all of the technology
5 While there is no unique deﬁnition that characterizes ﬁrms’ intangible assets empirically, a number of
management skill and technology variables are often used as proxies for intangible assets in these empirical
studies. It is generally accepted both by academics and practicing managers that these intangible non-physical
factors are an integral part of the decision processes for ﬁrms’ foreign direct investment and other types offoreign
market entry. Firm managers, of course, must decide, depending on the real business circumstances they face,
which intangible factors they should focus on. Similarly it is up to academic researchers to make judgements
about which intangible factors should be considered as the driving force of the economic model being considered.
(We wish to add that, in many ways, this situation is really not different even when academics or practicing
managers consider ﬁrms’ physical quantities such as numbers from ﬁnancial statements. It is not usual that we
have precisely the right kinds of variables correctly measured for the type of decision problems we have at hand.
For example, most economists and ﬁnancial analysts argue that accounting numbers which are often manipulated
or based on book value are not suitable for ﬁrms’ economic decision purposes. In such cases more appropriate
proxies based on market transactions might have to be used in their analyses.) It is for these reasons that we feel it
reasonable to use intangible assets in modeling ﬁrms’ decision processes for foreign direct investment.
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fraction of the current annual US research and development budget. It was a cost that was
very high, at times, for individual kaisha (Japanese ﬁrm). The down-payment on Dupont’s
nylon patent was equal to the entire capitalization at the time of Toyo Rayon, now Toray
Industries.From the sellers’ point of view, the results have been disastrous. Technologies
sold to Japanese companies has come back in improved form to cerate competitive
nightmares.”
For practicing managers, many established consulting ﬁrms provide guidelines
about how to measure intangible assets of various types. For example, in their
presentation of ‘the science of alliances: governance roles and responsibilities
(Roussel, 2004)’ Accenture emphasizes the importance of management’s skill to value
both tangible and intangible assets in light of changing market conditions. In
describing the services they offer client ﬁrms, Ernst & Young (2004) emphasize their
ability to value intellectual property and other intangible assets for the purpose of
acquisitions, disposals, licensing and strategic alliances. The accounting profession has
traditionally paid signiﬁcant attention to valuation and measurement of ﬁrms’
intangible assets including good will. Accordingly, in updating the changing business
environment the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the United States recently
issued new accounting standards that have changed both the method under which
business combinations are accounted for and the method of accounting for acquired
good will and other intangible assets. (SFAS 141 supercedes APB 16 and SFAS 142
supercedes APB 17.) These new rules mean that the valuation of intangible assets is
of paramount importance (see, for example, Stout, 2001.)
Effectiveness of ﬁrms’ technology spillover protection depends to a large extent on
the legal environment. In this regard, it is possible to measure empirically
enforceability of intellectual property (IP) rights protection (e.g. Ostergard, 2000)
and hence such measurement framework can be potentially incorporated in our model.
Empirical evidence also exists that, in making their FDI decisions, multinational ﬁrms
do pay attention to the degree of enforcement of intellectual property rights protection
in host countries (e.g. Mansﬁeld, 1994 for India and Smarzynka, 2002 for Eastern
Europe.)
6
In Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we model technology-based ﬁrms’ decisions on the
forms of ownership for their foreign subsidiaries. We are particularly interested in the
determinants of the forms of ownership for a foreign subsidiary: whether it is FP’s
fully owned subsidiary or a joint venture with a JP; and the degree of FP’s ownership
in JV. In modeling joint ventures we treat FP and JP as symmetrically positioned
partners who both face the potential spillover of their intangible assets. We approach
this modeling problem from the perspective of the theory of contracts which addresses
the question of the allocation of decision rights between contracting parties.
Contractibility of foreign operations and control of residual rights play important
roles in this framework. In analyzing ownership shares for joint ventures between FP
6 Such enforcement affects ﬁrms’ costs of technology spillovers in our model (see also Clegg & Cross, 2000.)
We will further discuss IPR protection below.
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of both FP and JP. We show that FP’s ownership share in its foreign subsidiary
generally depends on the conditions under which its intangible assets (and JP’s in
case of a JV) are transferred to JV as well as on its bargaining power relative to
JP’s.
7
Later we apply our model predictions to analyze empirically the ownership structures
of technology-based foreign ﬁrms’ operations in Japan. Our empirical ﬁndings are
generally consistent with the model predictions.
2.1.1. Ownership of foreign operations and contractibility
FP’s operations in a host country generally require both tangible and intangible
production inputs from FP, local ﬁrms and local workers. Suppose all production inputs
required by FP’s operations are observable and the quantities of the inputs used and the
resulting output produced are veriﬁable. (This means that a dispute, for example, about the
illegal use of FP’s production input can be unequivocally resolved by a third party (like a
court) which contradicts or conﬁrms disputing party’s observation.) Furthermore suppose
that there are well-speciﬁed contracting mechanisms for the use of each input and the
disposition of outputs. Under these ideal conditions there is no need for FP to own any part
of its foreign operations since all aspects of the operations can be contracted out to local
input providers and ﬁrms.
8
In practice there are certain important reasons why some of these ideal conditions fail to
hold, particularly for an FP whose operations are large-scale and technology-based. First,
many contractual relationships may result in the cost of agency due to the lack of
incentives on the part of input providers in the host country. Foreign agents who provide
service and goods under contracts to the FP may have little incentive to be efﬁcient
providers. The FP may have to use extra resources to monitor the agents, and, may in the
end feel vertical integration, or direct ownership of some or all of its foreign operations
would be essential.
Secondly, it is possible that certain production inputs (e.g. intangible assets) are not
observable. The quantities of some intangible assets inputs and the output produced may
7 Our bargaining model is reasonably general and theoretically justiﬁable (at least from the perspective ofﬁrm
behavior) and yet it is empirically implementable. We point out that one of the reasons for our efforts to develop
models like the one given in this paper is to respond to the criticism in the literature about the lack of theoretical
frameworks in the topical area that our paper is concernedwith. Yan and Zeng (1999),for example, argue the lack
of theoretical frameworks for research in dynamic behavior of international joint ventures. The present approach
potentially provides a theoretically sound and yet practical modeling approach to analysis of international joint
ventures over time.
8 The problem of non-contractibility associated with technology and other intangible assets does not seem to
exist to the same degree for most tangible or physical assets (e.g. raw material, capital equipment), since the
amounts of transfer of these assets and output resulting from their use are often veriﬁable. It is also important to
note that so long as contracts can effectively protect the rights of parent (transferring) ﬁrms (i.e. complete
contracting is possible), ownership structure may not matter even if there is information asymmetry between FP
and its contracting ﬁrms including JP in the host country. On the other hand, Hart and Holmstro ¨m (1987) stress
thatcontractincompleteness canlead todeparturesfromthe ﬁrst-bestsolutionevenwhenthereare noinformation
asymmetries among the contracting parties and the parties are risk-neutral. They also suggest that incompleteness
can throw light on the importance of the allocation of decision rights or rights of control.
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producing FP’s product under FP’s successful brand name requires no presence of FP in
the host country as the owner of the production process. Yet, under certain circumstances
it may be difﬁcult for FP to limit the use of its licensed technology or its brand name to
originally speciﬁed purposes without owning the production facilities in the host country.
That is, ownership structure matters if transfer of inputs and the output produced from
those inputs do not form contractible events.
When the value of an input is not veriﬁable, it is difﬁcult to write contracts to
protect parent ﬁrms’ beneﬁts. This is the case, for instance, when transfer of intangible
assets is involved in a joint venture. The value of such a transfer is unveriﬁable,
because the output resulting from such an asset transfer is hard to measure, and
secondly the cost of transfer accrued to the parent ﬁrm, particularly the cost associated
with the spillover of an asset is also difﬁcult to measure. Non-contractible output arises,
for example, when JV’s accounting procedure cannot delineate every beneﬁt resulting
from the use of FP’s transferred assets. The cost of spillover to FP of its technology or
other intangible assets may arise because competitors (including joint venture partners)
in the host country could potentially learn FP’s technology ﬁrst hand once it is placed
in JV’s production facilities.
9
OECD (1989) also points out that difﬁcult legal questions regarding enforceability of
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) exist for large-scale joint ventures and
international patent networks. The amounts of spillover depend, to some extent, on how
IPR protection is implemented in the host country. In this sense, determination of how
much of the foreign parent ﬁrm’s patents and unpatented proprietary technologies is
legally accessible to the local partner matters. The host country’s legal environment also
potentially constrains the validity of any contractual arrangements that the joint venture
partners agree on (e.g. Smarzynka, 2002).
In many developing economies the host governments require the availability of
technology transfer (and associated spillover) to be a pre-requisite for approval of the
proposed joint ventures or other types of FDI. This was the accepted government policy in
Japan until the 1970s. This is the policy in China. These national policies reﬂected in the
legal (and cultural) environment and the associated technology management practices
would often increase the local partner’s bargaining power in demanding higher levels of
joint venture ownership. Where signiﬁcant growth is expected for the market of the host
country, the foreign partner may still accept joint ventures with somewhat less than
optimal ownership shares in the joint venture.
At its national economy level, a host country which is eager to receive foreign
technology faces a policy trade-off between foreign ﬁrms’ willingness to invest in that
country and developing their own domestic industry on their own. The developing nations
that favor their own domestic industry without FDI tend to have weak intellectual property
rights protection. It is important to point out in this regard that there is empirical evidence
9 For this reason some ﬁrms by corporate policy do not use joint ventures for their primary subsidiaries. For
example, both IBM and Coca-Cola left India entirely in the late 1970s when the Indian government demanded
that their fully owned Indian operations be turned into joint ventures with local companies (Encarnation &
Vachani, 1985).)
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rights protection in the host country (see Lee & Mansﬁeld, 1996; Mansﬁeld 1994, 1995).
10
A number of anecdotal cases are also consistent with the evidence. For example, Japan
chose the policies emphasizing developing technology-based manufacturing industries
without FDI until the 1970s, which went together with relatively weak protection of
intellectual property rights. Indeed Japan did receive relatively little (inward) FDI
throughout the 1950s through the 1990s. Japan reversed their ofﬁcial policy in this regard
following the burst of its ﬁnancial bubble in 1990. It now argues it welcomes inward
foreign direct investment. Despite such a reversal of the ofﬁcial policy the general business
culture and policy environment in Japan which discouraged FDI for many decades does
not appear to have changed much yet. Even the Japanese government now recognizes that
Japan is paying the high price for the lack of adequate FDI in terms of the lack of foreign
company generated competition in many industries and also the lack of employment such
foreign ﬁrms might have generated in Japan.
2.1.2. Foreign operations involving the cost of technology spillover
In this section, we present a model for a case in which transfer of intangible assets is
veriﬁable, but it is difﬁcult to write a contract which prohibits potential competitors
(including joint venture partners) from taking advantage of the transferred assets. This
case happens, for example, when transferred assets are an observable brand name, a patent
or a complete set of technology which is not divisible. The control power that comes with
ownership of foreign operations can reduce the potential spillover cost accrued to the
owner. By controlling the way their assets are to be used, the owner can reduce or
eliminate any inappropriate use of the assets.
Suppose FP has an opportunity for foreign operation with the expected income Y,where
Y is assumed to be constant.
11 This operation requires intangible assets as inputs from both
FP and JP, FP’s potential joint venture partner. (Both FP and JP are assumed to be risk
neutral ﬁrms in the following.) By licensing intangible assets required for the operation,
either FP or JP alone, or a third party, could potentially run this operation under some
(incomplete) contract. We assume that transfer of the intangible assets required for the
operation is itself veriﬁable but the output resulting from the use of the transferred assets is
not veriﬁable. Suppose that, without any ownership in the operation, FP and JP incur the
maximum costs of technology spillover, CF and CJ, respectively. These costs of spillover
are assumed to decrease as the owners of intangible assets increase their ownership shares
in the operation.
10 For example, until the early 1990s enforcement of IPR protection in India was also poor and many US ﬁrms
were reluctant to transfer their technology even under contract. Mansﬁeld (1994, p. 15) notes, however, that more
US ﬁrms are now willing to transfer technology to their afﬁliates in India which did change its environment for
protection of intellectual property rights in the 1990s. Smarzynka (2002) presents recent empirical evidence on
this for foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe: for example, the types of activities and industries FDI bring
in are heavily inﬂuenced by the degree of enforcement of intellectual property rights protection in host countries.
11 Our income variable (with expected value Y) does not include the costs and beneﬁts of spillover of intangible
assets such as technology. Our model thus focuses on analysis of such costs and beneﬁts. Further discussion on
this is found below.
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(The introduction of such side payments, however, would not change our results to
follow.) This assumption is justiﬁed on the practical ground that side payments in the
context of international operations correspond to the contractible aspects of the use of
intangible assets such as technology and name brand. It is customary to contract away
contractible aspects of transactions involving technical licencing or brand use in the form
of lump-sum payments or royalty payments on product sales. We are interested, however,
in non-contractible aspects of the use of intangible assets for which meaningful side
payments cannot be determined. In this paper, we use ownership in an international
operation as a primary decision variable.
Denote by b FP’s ownership share in the operation, where 0%b%1. Then JP’s share is
1Kb. The net expected beneﬁts from the operation for FP and JP are given by:
12
FP : UF ZbY CbgFCJ Kð1KbÞCF ZbðY CgFCJ CCFÞKCF (1a)
JP : UJ Zð1KbÞY Cð1KbÞgJCF KbCJ
ZðY CgJCFÞKbðY CgJCF CCJÞ: (1b)
bgFCJ and (1Kb)gJCF, respectively, denote the portions of their respective partner’s
technology spillover that FP and JP receive., where 0!gF, gJ!1. When gFZ1( gJZ1),
then JP’s (FP’s) spillover all goes to FP (JP).
Our model assumes that joint venture’s future income is a random variable but its
expected value (Y) is constant. This implies that the partner ﬁrms’ costs and beneﬁts of
spillover enter as separate terms in the ﬁrms’ net beneﬁt functions (1a) and (1b). Note also
that the joint venture’s income can be either a static random variable or a stochastic
process with constant expected value Y.
13 In order to focus on the factors of immediate
interest to us our model given above implicitly assumes the following: (1) the economic
fundamentals underlying a proposed joint venture which generate its future expected
income (Y) are assumed to be known to both parent ﬁrms at the outset of their negotiations;
and (2) all predictable time-varying factors (e.g. seasonalities) have been removed from
our joint venture income. These assumptions are reasonable and realistic. For example, it
is not likely that one joint venture partner could hide knowledge of some fundamentals that
might contribute to the true income potentials of the proposed joint venture from the other
negotiating partner, given that both partners involved are assumed to be highly
sophisticated players in international business. Both parties can also protect themselves
from such potential deceptions by contract. The second assumption allows us to remove
12 We follow the framework in Nakamura and Xie (1998).
13 One stochastic process we have in mind for the joint venture income is a random walk process. (Since we do
not need this assumption, it is not explicitly assumed in the paper.) Substantial amounts of empirical evidence
exist in the literature suggesting that the income processes ofﬁrms including joint venture ﬁrms follow a random
walk (e.g. Albrecht, Lookabill, & McKeown, 1977; Dechow, Kothari, & Watts, 1998; Watts & Leftwich, 1977).
Conditional on the current income which is viewed as constant, expected value of a random walk process is also
constant representing the past income.
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model assumptions still allow for occurrences of unexpected surprises or shocks.
In our modeling framework the joint venture partners will adjust their ownership shares
in response to changes in the values of model parameters (including Y and the factors
which describe the bargaining power parameter) without delay in each time period.
14 This
framework also accommodates the local partner’s learning which is reﬂected in their
increased R&D spending. Such changes in R&D expenditures will enter our model
estimation through changes in the bargaining power parameter and prompts changes in the
joint venture ownership shares.
In order that FP and JP choose to have a JV, we must have
UFR0o rbR   b (2a)
UJR0o rb%   b (2b)
where
 
b Z
CF
Y CgFCJ CCF
(3a)
  b Z
Y CgJCF
Y CgJCF CCJ
: (3b)
 
b is the minimum acceptable ownership share for FP, while 1K   bZCJ=ðYCgJCFC
CJÞ is the minimum acceptable ownership share for JP. The feasible region for b,( b,  b), is
empty if
ðY CgFCJÞðY CgJCFÞ!CFCJ
holds, that is, expected income including the beneﬁts from the joint venture partner’s
technology spillover is small relative to the costs of the total spillover. In this case FP
would have no foreign operation. In the following we assume (YCgFCJ)YCgJCF)OCFCJ.
Note also that: bZ0 if and only if CFZ0, and   bZ1 if and only if CJZ0.
Suppose both FP and JP cooperate fully in maximizing the joint expected beneﬁt in
determining their ownership shares. This provides us with the ﬁrst-best solution b
FB as
follows
Maxb Y Kð1KbÞð1KgJÞCF Kbð1KgFÞCJ
subject to ð2Þ:
(4a)
Note that if gFZgJZ1, then ownership share b plays no role since UFCUJZY. The
ﬁrst-best optimal ownership share for FP is:
b
FB Z   b if ð1KgJÞCFOð1KgFÞCJ (4b)
14 We point out below that US ﬁrms, for example, adjusted their ownership shares in their FDI operations in
Japan frequently in response to the Japanese government policy changes.
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b if ð1KgJÞCF!ð1KgFÞCJ (4c)
This means that, under ideal conditions, the ownership share for the parent ﬁrm with a
larger spillover cost should be maximized. Note, in particular, that
b
FB Z1i fCJ Z0;CFO0 (4d)
b
FB Z0i fCJO0;CF Z0: (4e)
The results (4d) and (4e) are consistent with our intuition that if a joint operation
requires transfer of only one parent ﬁrm’s intangible assets, that parent ﬁrm should own
the operation fully.
The ﬁrst-best solutions (4b) and (4c) are not likely to be implemented in practice since
the assumption of full cooperation underlying the linear programming problem (4a) is
unlikely to hold given that neither the use of intangible assets nor the production output
which makes use of the intangible assets as inputs are veriﬁable or contractible. Under
such conditions both FP and JP will attempt to maximize their ownership shares in the IJV
to protect their own interests. Given that the ﬁrst-best solution is not achievable, FP and JP
begin negotiation.
A behavioral model which is suitable to describe the negotiation process between FP
and JP in determining their ownership shares in the operation is the Nash bargaining
solution (Nash, 1950). We denote the relative bargaining power of FP and JP, respectively,
by a and (1Ka), where 0%a%1.
Following the literature (e.g. Farge & Wells, 1982) we assume that the parent ﬁrms’
bargaining power is an exogenously given parameter.
15 Then the Nash bargaining
solution, b
NB, is given by
Max
b
U
a
FU
1Ka
J (5)
where UF and UJ are given by (1a) and (1b). b
NB is given by
b
NB Za  bCð1KaÞ
 
b Z
 
bCað  bK
 
bÞ (6)
where   b and
 
b are given by (3b) and (3a), respectively. Note that, for 0%a%1, we
have
 
b%bNB%   b.
In extreme cases where either FP or JP has all the bargaining power, we have
b
NB Z   b if ah1 (7a)
b
NB Zb if ah0: (7b)
Comparing (7a) and (7b) with (4b) and (4c), we see that the ﬁrst-best solution and the
Nash bargaining solution coincide in the extreme cases where (1KgJ)CFO(1KgF)CJ
15 We will relax this assumption in Section 4 where learning and other factors can change bargaining powerover
time.
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gJ)CF!(1KgF)CJ implies that JP possesses the entire bargaining power (1Ka)Z1. In
general, however, b
NB does not coincide with b
FB.
The loss of efﬁciency incurred by adopting the Nash bargaining solution rather than the
ﬁrst-best solution is given by the difference in expected income from the operation YK
(1Kb)(1KgJ)CFKb(1KgF)CJ evaluated at bZb
FB and bZb
NB. It is calculated using
(4b), (4c) and (6) as follows:
½  bKa  bKð1KaÞ
 
b ½ð1KgJÞCF Kð1KgFÞCJ 
Zð1KaÞð  bK
 
bÞ½ð1KgJÞCF Kð1KgFÞCJ  if ð1KgJÞCFOð1KgFÞCJ (8)
and
½  bKa  bKð1KaÞ
 
b ½ð1KgJÞCF Kð1KgFÞCJ 
Zað  bK
 
bÞ½ð1KgFÞCJ Kð1KgJÞCF  if ð1KgJÞCF!ð1KgFÞCJ: (9)
An upper bound for the efﬁciency loss is given by ð  bK
 
bÞjð1KgJÞCFKð1KgFÞCJj.
This upper bound is achieved when the entire bargaining power rests with the parent ﬁrm
whose net cost of spillover is smaller than the other parent ﬁrms.
16
An important empirical issue is how the Nash bargaining solution b
NB depends on FP’s
bargaining power, a. From (6) we see that dbNB=daZ   bK
 
bO0. b
NB increases linearly as
FP’s bargaining power relative to JP’s increases. Thus the greater the parent ﬁrm’s
bargaining power is, the larger its ownership share in the IJV operation becomes. This also
implies that with a higher bargaining power FP will be able to receive a larger share of
IJV’s proﬁts bYCbgFCJ (see 1a).
2.2. Summary of ﬁndings
In Section 2.1.2, we have presented a bargaining model for FP’s foreign operations. In
our model transfer of intangible assets is veriﬁable but its use is not veriﬁable. Also
contractibility of output is not satisﬁed, and potential parent ﬁrms are likely to demand
positive ownership shares in JV. We believe this model describes at least approximately
many practical situations involving technology-based ﬁrms’ ownership decisions on their
FDI. The ﬁrst-best solution is likely to be feasible only if a foreign operation requires only
one of the parent ﬁrms’ intangible assets (usually FP’s intangible assets). In such a case,
16 As a policy application, suppose only FP suffers from spillovers due to host country’s weak IP protection (i.e.
CFO0, CJZ0, gJZ1 and gFZ0 in (1a) and (1b), and bZCF=ðYCCFÞ by (3a) and (3b)). Then FP’s optimal
negotiatedownershipshareintheIJVisbNBZaCð1KaÞbOaby(6),i.e.FPmustdemandforalargersharethan
theshare,a,whichcorrespondstotheamountofFP’sintrinsiccontributiontotheIJV.IfhostcountrystrengthensIP
protection and hence eliminates FP’s spillovers, then we have CFZbZ0 and b
NBZa. FP now must consider only
the fundamentals that it can contribute to the IJV in negotiating for its ownership share in the IJV.
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FBZ1) and contract out necessary production
inputs locally.
If the ﬁrst-best solution for setting up a fully owned subsidiary is not feasible, FP and its
potential JP will either adopt a second-best strategy or proceed to a Nash bargaining
solution. We have argued that the latter is more likely to be implemented in practice. Our
empirical results show that, in case of joint ventures, FP’s ownership share is correlated
positively (negatively) with the amount of transfer of FP’s (JP’s) intangible assets from FP
(JP) to JV. FP’s ownership share also increases (decreases) with FP’s (JP’s) bargaining
power relative to JP’s (FP’s).
17
2.3. Relevance of the bargaining approach
As is seen from Eqs. (1a) and (1b)), our model is not a two-person zero-sum game for
various combinations of values for the model parameters CJ, Cf, gF, gJ and b. For this
reason von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944, 1947, 1953) theory of zero-sum two-
person games cannot be used for analyzing the present problem. It is precisely for this type
of the problem that the original Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) was proposed (e.g.
Crawford, 2000). A number of variations of the original Nash model were also developed
(e.g. Rubinstein, 1982).
In general, all bargaining situations including ours have two things in common that
distinguish them from two-person zero-sum game situations: (1) the total payoff to the
negotiating parties should be greater than the sum of what they would get in the absence of
agreement; and (2) it is not a zero-sum game.
The Nash bargaining solution we use in this paper is an essential component of the
theories that explain, for example, the behavior of the ﬁrm (Grossman & Hart, 1986) and
the strategic implications of trade wars and trade agreements in international business
(Grossman and Helpman (1995)). For these and other reasons the use of the Nash
bargaining solution provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for studying the bargaining
processes involved in joint venture formations.
In the next Section 3, we present our empirical results using a sample of foreign ﬁrms’
operations in Japan.
3. Bargaining model: foreign ﬁrms’ FDI operations in Japanese manufacturing
industries
We have shown that FP’s ownership shares in its IJVs are positively correlated with its
bargaining power relative to JP’s. Fully owned subsidiaries (SUB) arise in the limiting
case where FP’s bargaining power relative to JP’s is very large. In this section we estimate
17 The present model can be extended to more complex models with different types of inputs of intangible assets
IJV requires from its parent ﬁrms. In all cases contractibility of output is not satisﬁed, and potential parent ﬁrms
are likely to demand positive ownership shares in JV. Also it is shown that FP’s ownership share in its IJV
increases with its relative bargaining power in all of these cases. (Nakamura & Xie, 1998.)
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ownership share and relative bargaining power.
3.1. Foreign direct investment in Japan
Foreign ﬁrms increased their direct investments in Japan from about $930 million in
1984 to more than $3.2 billion in 1988. Most of these investments came from the US and
Europe. Foreign ﬁrms’ operations in Japan are large relative to domestic Japanese ﬁrms.
About one-third of foreign afﬁliated ﬁrms are capitalized at more than 100 million yen
while 99% of all domestic Japanese ﬁrms are capitalized at less than 100 million yen
(Toyo Keizai, 1989). This is also reﬂected, for example, in the fact that US ﬁrms’
operations in Japan are considerably larger, on average, than US ﬁrms’ foreign operations
in other countries (US Dept. of Commerce (1980, 1985)). They are also more proﬁtable
than domestic ﬁrms (Nakamura, 1991).
The ownership patterns for foreign ﬁrms’ subsidiaries were under strict government
supervision until 1950. By the 1950 Law Concerning Foreign Investment, however,
foreign ﬁrms were permitted to own at most 49% of Japanese ﬁrms. This law was changed
in 1973 to permit foreign ﬁrms to obtain, subject to certain exceptions, full ownership. In
1977, 7% of US ﬁrms’ subsidiaries reported they were required to limit their US parent
ﬁrms’ equity. In 1982 the fraction decreased to 3%. This compares with 1982 fractions of,
for example, 1% for France and for West Germany, 2% for Italy and 3% for Australia
(Contractor, 1990). Thus it appears that the shares offoreign ownership in Japan could be,
and were, adjusted relatively frequently in recent years in response to company and
government policies reﬂecting the interests of foreign and Japanese parent ﬁrms and
Japanese domestic considerations. For example, at least 314 (190) foreign ﬁrms’
subsidiaries have been established in Japan in 1988 (in 1989) while the ownership patterns
for at least 151 (100) subsidiaries have changed during the same period (Toyo Keizai
(1989, 1990)). Further details of the history of Japanese business environment concerning
FDI and technology transfer in our sample period are discussed in Appendix B.
18
Our bargaining model applies to ownership share determination problems under
general joint venture conditions. In this paper, we apply this model to explain observed
ownership shares of technology-based IJVs in Japan which were created until the 1980s.
The post-World War II period until the late 1970s in Japan is well known for the heavily
regulated policies on FDI where joint ventures were generally preferred to fully owned
subsidiaries by Japanese government regulators. In this period FPs negotiated with not
only with JPs but also with the Japanese government which had to approve any form of
FDI.
19 Many prominent JVs were established during this historical period. We limit our
sample period to the end of the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s regulations on FDI and the
associated foreign ownership shares were mostly gone. It is also around this period that
18 In Appendix B we discuss Japanese industrial policy which favored IJVs over fully owned subsidiaries until
the end of the 1970s. This is our primary reason why we have chosen our sample period to study IJVs.
19 Pan and Li (2000, p. 181) note that the lack of bargaining power vis a vis the host country government parties
is a primary reason for foreign ﬁrms’ inability to get permission for a 50% or higher equity stake in their IJVs in
China.
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instead of joint ventures.
20
3.2. Our sample period
Historically speaking, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant event of our interest is relaxation in Japan’s
policy environment towards FDI, particularly technology-based foreign ﬁrms’ FDI
occurred around the early 1980s, as noted above. Most of formal legal restrictions were
removed and foreign manufacturers were able to establish fully owned subsidiaries, if they
so desired. As a result relatively fewer JVs were established. Another major event in the
Japanese economy happened in late 1990 when a ﬁnancial bubble burst in Japan. The
Japanese economy since then has been experiencing various types of signiﬁcant macro-
level and ﬁrm-level changes and restructuring. Our sample period includes the ﬁrst event
which adds appropriate variance to our sample of joint ventures. Our sample period ends
right before the burst of the Japanese bubble by design. Japan’s post-bubble period
consists of many changes in regulations (not all of which are being removed) and
institutions, which resulted in a drastic change in the business environment of that country
for both inward and outward FDI. It is our plan to study the post-bubble period in a
separate study.
3.3. Empirical speciﬁcation and estimation results
We test our bargaining model in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we estimate the
probability that FP sets up a fully owned subsidiary (SUB) as a function of P, a bargaining
variable, and other explanatory variables. Assuming that the bargaining model hypothesis
holds, the variables that increase FP’s bargaining power (JP’s bargaining power) increase
(decrease) the probability that FP sets up its own fully owned subsidiary. In the second
stage, assuming that FP sets up an IJV, we estimate FP’s ownership share in the IJV, b,a sa
function of P and other explanatory variables (B1). If the bargaining model hypothesis
holds, then the variables that increase FP’s bargaining power (JP’s bargaining power)
increase (decrease) b.
3.4. FP’s probability of setting up a SUB
We estimate the probability that FP chooses a fully owned subsidiary, SUB (dependent
variable qZ1), over a joint venture, JV (qZ0), using a probit model:
Probðq Z1Þ ZProbðG1ðP;B1ÞO31Þ ZFðG1Þ (10)
where 31 is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance s2
1 and F is the
distribution function for a standard normal variable. The function G1 is given by
G1 Zð1=s1Þða function of regressorsÞ ZG1ðP;B1Þ (11)
20 This is consistent with our model prediction that FP’s increased bargaining power relative to that of JP’s will
lead FP to set up fully owned subsidiaries or joint ventures with increased ownership share for FP.
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general machinery, precision and pharmaceutical industries. Foreign parent ﬁrms which
fully or partially own these operations adjust their ownership shares in these operations
regularly to reﬂect their optimal decisions. Also the skills spillover to Japanese
competitors in these industries is known to be of signiﬁcant concern for foreign parent
ﬁrms. Thus our data seem quite suitable for testing our model implications (see Table A1
in Appendix A1 for descriptive statistics of the sample.)
Since FP’s bargaining power (a in Eq. (5)), or equivalently, JP’s bargaining power (1K
a), is not observable, we consider proxies (P) which are thought to affect FP’s and JP’s
bargaining power.
More speciﬁcally, P in Eqs. (10) and (11) consists of variables which affect FP’s
bargaining power relative to JP’s. As proxies for the factors affecting P we consider the
following variables: the proportion of imports from FP in IJV’s procurement (%IMP), the
proportion of exports in IJV’s sales (%EXP), the R&D-to-sales ratios for FP and JP (R&D-
Table A1
Descriptive statistics: bargaining model sample
All Fully owned (bZ1) Jointly owned (b!1)
FP’s ownership share (b) .74(.25)
a 1.0(0) .56(.17)
%IMP .49(.37) .69(.33) .35(.33)
%EXP .11(.19) .09(.14) .12(.15)
#W-JV
b 619(2,156) 649(1,812) 599(1,211)
#W-FP
c 47,306(76,677) 42,050(51,383) 50,951(97,200)
CAPITAL-JV
d 4,446(34,261) 3,023(12,112) 5,432(11,121)
R&D-FP
e .06(.05) .08(.05) .05(.04)
R&D-JP
e – – .02(.03)
Ind R&D-FRN
f .07(.03) .08(.03) .06(.03)
Ind R&D-JPN
f .05(.02) .06(.02) .05(.02)
P/E Ratio-FP
g 15.4(4.3) 15.7(4.0) 15.2(.02)
P/E Ratio-JP
g – – 36.3(35.8)
Europe
h .39 .40 .38
Electric equipment
i .28 .23 .33
Precision
i .12 .12 .12
Pharmaceutical
i .18 .22 .15
General machinery
i .42 .43 .40
Selection bias .528
j ––
No. of observations 231 94 137
Source: Calculated from Toyo Keizai (1993). Data are for 1991.
a Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
b Numbers of workers employed by FP’s operation in Japan.
c Numbers of workers employed by FP.
d Capitalization (book value) for FP’s operation in million yen.
e Firm R&D/sales ratios for the parent ﬁrms of U-S- Japan joint ventures
f Industry R&D/sales ratios for the US and Japanese industries to which the parent ﬁrms of US–Japan joint
ventures belong.
g The price-earnings ratios for the parent ﬁrms of US–Japan joint ventures.
h FP is a European ﬁrm.
i Industry dummy variables.
j Calculated using the expanded sample described in Table A2.
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size of FP’s operation in Japan measured by the number of workers (#W-JV).
IJV’s imports from FP’s global production network reﬂect FP’s superb technology and
other intangible assets including its ability to manage global operations. Hence they
provide FP with a considerable amount of bargaining power. Most of IJV’s imports are in
the form of intermediate goods from FP. Since FP’s technology is less likely to be lost to
potential competitors if IJV imports FP’s technology in the form of intermediate goods
rather than in the form of technology licensing agreement, %IMP also measures the degree
of FP’s bargaining power which allows FP to transfer its technology in the form of
intermediate goods rather than relying on licensing agreements. IJV’s exports (%EXP)
also reﬂects the fraction of IJV’s output that is sold to overseas, often through FP’s
superior global distribution and marketing channels. This suggests that %EXP also
contributes to FP’s bargaining power.
One of FP’s most important intangible assets is its investment in R&D (R&D-FP),
which strengthens its bargaining power. It is also likely that large R&D-FP is associated
with higher levels of non-contractibility in IJV’s output and the inputs from FP as well as
higher degree of potential spillover of FP’s technology. Our prediction is that the higher
R&D-FP, the more ownership FP demands in JV. JP’s R&D status (R&D-JP) in Japan, on
the other hand, negatively impacts FP’s bargaining power and hence negatively correlated
with FP’s ownership in JV. (We will replace ﬁrm R&D ratios with the corresponding
industry average R&D ratios for the US and Japan, R&D-US and R&D-JPN, in FP’s ﬁrst
stage choice between SUB and a JV, since FP’s potential JV partners and their ﬁrm-
speciﬁc R&D ratios are unknown.)
The price-earnings ratios, P/EKFP and P/EKJP, are expected to capture the intangible
(ﬁnancial, managerial and other) assets FP and JP each own. In bilateral negotiations
between FP and JP, therefore, a large value for P/EKFP (P/EKJP) is likely to increase
(decrease) FP’s bargaining power. In order to capture the long-term effects of intangible
assets we include as our P/E variables the price-earnings ratios averaged over 10 years
prior to the sample periods in the JV ownership share Eq. (11).
FP’s other important intangible assets include its brand name, the reputation of its
product outside Japan and its ability to organize its operations in Japan as part of its
international network of production. Many successful FP operations in Japan export
signiﬁcant amounts of their output to overseas markets, including FP’s operations
elsewhere outside Japan. Such exports also reﬂect FP’s ability to take advantage of Japan’s
comparative advantage in manufacturing. JV’s export-to-sales ratio generally reﬂects the
strengths of FP’s brand name, product reputation and ability for global production
strategy, and hence FP’s bargaining power.
WealsoincludeIJV’ssize(numberofworkersJVemploys,#W-JV).ThelargesizeofFP’s
operation may weaken FP’s bargaining power because of the difﬁculty (e.g. agency cost)
associatedwith havingtomanage alargelocal workforcealonewithoutaJapanesepartner.
In (11) the explanatory variables of particular interest are %IMP(C), %EXP(C),
%R&DKUS(C), %R&D-JPN(K) and #W-JV(K), where the expected signs are given in
parentheses. Estimation results for our probit model (11) are presented in Table 1. %IMP,
%R&DKUS and %R&DKJPN are highly signiﬁcant with expected signs. Other variables
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the bargaining hypothesis.
3.5. FP’s ownership share in IJV
If FP chooses to have an IJV, FP’s ownership share (s) in IJV is determined by the
bilateral negotiation between FP and JP according to Eq. (12) below in which P now
contains ﬁrm-speciﬁc R&D-to-sales and P/E ratios.
b ZG2ðP;B2Þ (12)
Since (12) is to be estimated using data on IJVs, our estimating equation will be
conditional on the event that FP chooses IJV. We use Heckman’s (1976,1979) selection
bias speciﬁcation
21 to correct for such sample conditioning in estimating (12).
Estimation results for (12) are presented in Table 2. Both %IMP and %EXP have
positive signs, as expected, and are signiﬁcant at a 1% level. JP’s bargaining power
reﬂected in R&D-JP and P/EKJP is also signiﬁcant. JV’s size (#W-JV) is also signiﬁcant
and negative, as expected. This is consistent with the presence of FP’s agency cost for
monitoring its large operation in Japan. Such agency cost is reduced by allowing a local
partner, JP, to participate in JV’s management (Nakamura & Yeung, 1994). The industry
dummies are not generally signiﬁcant. (The only exception is in the ﬁrst column (1) where
no R&D nor P/E variables are included.)
Table 1
Probit estimates for the probability that foreign ﬁrms choose fully owned subsidiaries
(1) (2)
%IMP 2.102***
a (8.34)
b 2.314*** (4.68)
%EXP .571 (1.32) K.342 (.367)
%R&D*US – .219*** (2.85)
%R&D*JPN – K.459*** (3.52)
#W-JV
a .000 (.991) .000 (.514)
Elec.eq.dummy – –
Prec.dummy .022 (.081) .891 (1.11)
Pharma.dummy .175 (.681) .896 (.090)
Gen.machi.dummy .671*** (3.31) 1.12 (.175)
Constant K1.704*** (7.71) .543 (.640)
Log likelihood K126.42 K47.76
No. of obs. 231
c 92
d
a See the text for the variable deﬁnitions. *,**,***: statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
b Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic absolute t-ratios.
c Includes all observations.
d The sample of ﬁrms for the regression reported in this column includes US ﬁrms’ operations in Japan for
which all relevant data required for the regression are available. In particular, in order to run this regression we
had to drop the IJVs with missing data from the original sample of 231 operations used for the regression reported
in column (1). (Typically R&D data is missing for at least one of the partners of the excluded IJVs.)
21 See also Amemiya (1985, §10.7).
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selection bias term and industry dummies become insigniﬁcant. This increases our
conﬁdence that our regressors capture the essential factors underlying FP’s and JP’s
ownership decisions in their IJV.
4. Learning from joint ventures
We have presented empirical evidence which isconsistent with our bargaining modelin
a static context. In this model the relative bargaining power each IJV partner possesses (i.e.
a and (1Ka), respectively) is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. Our empirical results suggest
that certain factors affect such bargaining power and hence the ownership shares of the IJV
partners. Such factors include, for example, each partner’s R&D capacity. In this paper,
we focus on JPs’ learning from their IJVs and show empirically that accumulation of JPs’
R&D capacity is affected by their experience with IJV operations over time. This implies
that the JP’s (local IJV partner’s) exposure to running the IJV itself may strengthen their
relative bargaining power position over time, which in turn may necessitate reorganization
of the ownership of the IJV itself. This occurs because each IJV partner’s intangible assets
are important determinants of their relative bargaining power, as we have seen above. This
Table 2
Determinants of foreign ﬁrms’ ownership shares in joint ventures
(1) (2) (3)
%IMP .772***
a (3.28)
b 1.08* (1.64) .973* (1.68)
%EXP .274*** (3.61) .485** (3.56) .458*** (3.84)
R&D-FP – .245 (.326) K.413 (.570)
R&D-JP – K.072** (2.40) K.079*** (3.24)
P/E-FP – – K.001 (.277)
P/E-JP – – K.002*** (3.28)
#W-JV K.00001*** (2.81) K.00001 (1.61) K.00001* (1.90)
Elec. Eq. dummy – – –
Prec. dummy K.042 (.851) K.046 (.382) .041 (.421)
Pharmac. dummy .047 (1.09) .036 (.451) .065 (.951)
Gen. Machi. dummy .111* (1.84) .161 (1.22) .147 (1.22)
Selection bias
c K.5.58** (2.60) K.784 (1.19) K.6.49 (1.19)
Constant .509*** (17.42) .463*** (6.76) .545*** (6.80)
R
2 .228 .457 .548
No. of obs. 137
d 49
e 49
e
a See the text for the variable deﬁnitions. *,**,***: statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
b Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity corrected absolute t-ratios (Amemiya, 1985.
c The possible bias due to selection into the subsample of IJVs is corrected by Heckman’s (1976, 1979)
selection bias term.
d All IJVs.
e The sample of ﬁrms for these regressions reported in this column includes U.S-Japan IJVs for which all
relevant data required for the regressionsare available. In particular, in order to run the regressionswe had to drop
the IJVs with missing data from the original sample of 137 operations used for the regression reported in column
(1). (Typically either R&D or P/E data are missing for at least one of the partners of the excluded IJVs.)
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observed dynamic instability of IJVs.
Because of the heavily protected environment in which IJVs were set up in the earlier
years of our sample period in Japan, it is likely that the Japanese government enforced the
requirement that there be some calculated technology spillovers out of IJVs in order for
permit to be issued to the IJVs.
22 It would not be surprising either that some of the JPs
which entered into IJV arrangements in the 1960s and early 1970s with foreign ﬁrms
counted on such spillovers to turn around their failing business strategies. For example, it
is well known that many of the Japanese ﬁrms that sought IJVs were not necessarily the
industry leaders in the respective Japanese markets.
23 We also note that even though the
primary area offocus for spillovers from IJVs to JPs was technology, such spillovers could
have also taken place in the area of advertising and marketing skill. For example, the
notion of differentiated consumer markets and strategies for developing them by investing
in advertising and marketing were almost non-existent in Japan in the 1960s. It is possible
that the IJVs gave their JPs opportunities to learn sophisticated advertising and marketing
methods.
4.1. Estimation results
We expand our sample used in Section 3 to include all Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms
that were listed in the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in ﬁscal year 1990. This
subsumes our earlier sample used for estimating the bargaining model. Expanding our
earlier sample was necessary, since our present estimation task involves estimating the
effects on JPs of the relatively infrequent occurrences of IJVs. Our focus will be on
estimating such effects on Japanese partner ﬁrms primarily because the IJVs we consider
during the sample periods were typically set up with technology transfer purposes in mind
by Japanese partners (and the Japanese government) only. Whether such actions did
impact, for example, JPs’ R&D behavior is of our interest. Secondly the IJVs in our study
were generally quite small relative to their foreign parent ﬁrms and hence were highly
unlikely to have inﬂuenced the behavior of their FPs. Thirdly detailed data for many of the
FPs are often not available from public sources for the historical period we consider. We
are interested in Japanese ﬁrms listed in the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
because they are considerably larger and more established than second section ﬁrms.
Typically more data are available for ﬁrst section ﬁrms. Relevant ﬁrm data were collected
for the sample period 1961–1990. During this period the ﬁrst section ﬁrms and foreign
22 Many Western multinationals argue that this is being practiced in China since the late 1980s.
23 For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) set up an IJV (Caterpillar–Mitsubishi) with Caterpillar in the
construction machinery industry where Komatsu was the industry leader and another IJV (Mitsubishi Motor
Corporation) with Chrysler in the passenger car industry where Toyota and Nissan were the industry leaders. It is
interesting to note that Komatsu and Toyota, which are both still industry leaders, never had IJVs in Japan with
foreign ﬁrms. MHI was not a player in either the construction machinery or passenger car industries at the time
these IJVs were set-up. Nevertheless, MHI (or, more broadly, the Mitsubishi keiretsu group) was desperate to
enter these growing markets and establish separate companies.
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Appendix A2 for the descriptive statistics of our sample.)
We measure the learning effects of IJVs on JPs’ R&D-sales ratios by the following
regression equation:
JP’sR&D ZG3ð#JVs;B3Þ; (13)
where #JVs is the total number of IJVs being operated by JP to the previous year. B3
includes a dummy variable corresponding to whether JP set up a new IJV in the present
year (JV-dummy), industry average R&D-sales ration (Ind_R&D) and a time trend
(calendar year, Year). The primary variable of interest is #JV, which we regard as a proxy
for JP’s learning from JPs’ older IJVs. Table 3 shows our regression results for our
learning model for various historical sample periods.
4.2. JP’s learning from IJV
We see from Table 3 that, after controlling for industry effects, #JVs have signiﬁcantly
positive effects on increasing JP’s R&D level. It is of interest to note that the degree of
impact increased signiﬁcantly from the period 1961–1970 (when the impact was negative)
to the period 1981–1990. This implies that joint ventures’ spillover effects on JPs’ R&D
have become increasingly important over time. This is in contrast to the immediate effects
of newly set up joint ventures (JV-dummy) that were positive in the 1960s but became
increasingly more negative over time. This suggests that in the 1960s foreign ﬁrms chose
Japanese IJV partners that were strong in R&D but this practice was dropped in the 1970s
and 1980s. In the last two decades, the Japanese partners chosen were generally weak in
R&D (and increasingly so). This is consistent with the notion that, because of the
industrial policy that was operational from the late 1950s to 1960s, joint ventures were
allocated to Japanese ﬁrms with strong R&D to maximize the effectiveness of transfers of
overseas technology. This was no longer the case in the 1970s and 1980s when ﬁrms with
weaker technology bases attempted to improve their positions by getting involved in IJVs.
Our overall results for the period 1961–1990 (model (1)) are that JPs continue to receive
positive spillovers in R&D from their IJVs even though they do not receive any beneﬁt
from the IJV established in the current year. In the next subsection we brieﬂy summarize
Table A2
Descriptive statistics: learning model sample
1961–90 Mean
(s.d.)
1961–70 Mean
(s.d.)
1971–80 Mean
(s.d.)
1981–90 Mean
(s.d.)
R&D .00544 (.01125) .00045 (.00229) .00532 (.00916) .00972 (.01519)
Ind_R&D .00544 (.00694) .00045 (.00143) .00532 (.00447) .00970 (.00870)
Year 16.100 (8.2236) 5.8187 (2.7702) 15.598 (2.8694) 25.128 (2.653)
JV-dummy .01054 .01848 .01049 .003998
Log(sale) 10.506 (1.3320) 10.070 (1.3170) 10.559 (1.2820) 10.815 (1.2970)
#JVs .20186 (.63620) .09962 (.36851) .22227 (.64167) .26633 (.77961)
No. of obs. 12717 3734 4481 4502
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disucssions.
4.3. Learning as a source of IJV Instability: a synthesis
Our framework allows us to consider certain simulation experiments.
Case 1. For example, suppose in 1981, an FP currently has a fully owned subsidiary
(SUB) with the following characteristics: %IMPZ.69, %EXPZ.09, #W-JVZ649, R&D-
FPZ.08 and Ind R&D-JPNZ.01. It is expected that the relevant Japanese manufacturing
industry will massively increase their R&D expenditures from the current almost non-
existent level of 0.01 to a new level of .05 within the next 10 years. This is in part driven by
Japanese competitors who are learning fast from their technology-based IJVs with FP’s
global competitors.
24 Under the Japanese government directives FP’s subsidiary will have
to reduce the amount of intermediate goods it sources from FP from the current level of 69
to 10%. They expect the export level to go up from the current 9 to 12%. All other
variables are expected to remain constant for the next 10 years. FP understands that their
relative bargaining position in Japan will probably change in response to these expected
changes in their business environment and is interested in estimating the probability that
they keep the present subsidiary as a fully owned subsidiary in 10 years.
Using (11) and our probit regression results reported in Table 1 we can calculate the
probability F(G1) before and after the expected changes in the business environment.
Suppose we use estimated coefﬁcients in column (2) of Table 1 and calculate the
expression G1 using the relevant mean values for all the explanatory variables. We get
3.02 and 2.16 for G1 for before and after the speciﬁed business environment changes.
Using a normal probability table we ﬁnd that the probability of full ownership for FP
decreases from the current 100 to 98% after the changes. If the Japanese government
Table 3
Japanese parent ﬁrms’ learning from their international joint ventures
(1) 1961–1990 (2) 1961–1970 (3) 1971–1980 (4) 1981–1990
Constant .0004**(2.01) K.0005*** (4.37) .0015* (1.87) .0039 (1.05)
#JVs .0013*** (8.44) K.0005*** (4.24) .0018*** (7.06) .0053*** (5.26)
Ind_R&D .9861*** (69.2) .944*** (.03) .9591*** (33.5) 1.09*** (21.4)
Year K.0000* (1.83) .00005*** (3.30) K.0001* (1.86) K.0002 (1.24)
JV-dummy K.0214*** (4.72) .0123*** (9.26) K.0292*** (3.60) K.3525*** (5.04)
Selection bias ––––
Adjusted R
2 ––––
No.of obs. 12717 3734 4481 4502
Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-ratios based on heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. *,** and ***
denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
24 The impact of learning from IJVs on their JPs’ R&D capacity can be also calculated numerically using our
regression results reported in Table 3. We note that the average R&D-sales ratio for all manufacturing ﬁrms in
Japan increased signiﬁcantly from 2.15% to 3.52% during the 10-year period: 1982–1992. The corresponding US
ﬁgure for the same period is 3.8% (1982) and 4.2% (1992). (Japanese Science and Technology Agency (1997, p.
216,; Tables 2 and 3)).
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intermediate goods SUB imports from FP, then %IMP becomes zero and G1 decreases to
1.23. Under this scenario the probability of FP’s full ownership decreases further to 89%,
more than a 10% decline compared to the present 100%.
Case 2. As another example, consider an IJV currently owned by FP and JP with FP’s
ownership being 85%. FP is concerned that their bargaining position relative to JP’s will
fall, which may force them to give up their majority ownership. The presently anticipated
changes over the next 10 years in FP’s business environment are as follows: import
substitution (%IMP drops from 50 to 20%); %EXP and R&D-FP remain constant,
respectively, at 12% and 6%; JP’s R&D capacity increases signiﬁcantly from 1% to 5%;
the number of employees (ﬁrm size) of the IJV (#W-JV) increases from 300 workers to
1,000 workers; and all other variables remain constant (Electric equipment dummyZ.33,
Precision dummyZ.12, Pharmaceutical dummyZ.15, General machinery dummyZ.40,
selection biasZ1.051).
Using our estimation results reported in Column (2) of Table 2, we ﬁnd that FP’s
expected ownership share in the IJV after the changes in business environment is 52%, a
drop of more than 30% from the current level of 85%.
Finally we note that selection bias term in Table 2 may be interpreted as the
unobservable forces that resist FP’s ownership in the IJV. Such resistance may represent
factors such as the general strength of JP and the corresponding Japanese domestic
industry, the regulations that the host government imposes on foreign companies and the
like. Such forces strengthen JP’s bargaining position. Suppose such resistance forces are
expected to increase signiﬁcantly from the current level of .528 (Table A1) to 1.0 over the
next 10 years. Then FP’s expected ownership share further declines by 30% to 20.1%.
5. Concluding remarks
We have presented a dynamic framework for ﬁrms’ FDI. Foreign ﬁrms (FPs) with
superior technology and other intangible assets try to enter an overseas market with either
a fully owned subsidiary (SUB) or an international joint venture (IJV) with as much
ownership share as possible. The ﬁrms’ intangible assets are an integral source of their
bargaining power in their negotiations with potential joint venture partners (JPs) in the
host country. Using foreign ﬁrms’ technology-based IJVs located in Japan we have
presented some empirical evidence that a bargaining model describes this process well.
Both FP’s and JP’s R&D capacity as well as other factors contribute to their respective
bargaining power. However, FP’s bargaining power relative to JP’s does not remain
constant over time. We have presented empirical evidence that, in a dynamic context, JP’s
learning from their own IJVs as well as the increasing R&D capacity of their industry will
enhance JP’s bargaining power. Such learning by JP, together with other factors, can
seriously undermine FP’s ownership of the IJV over time.
We have shown that changes over time in the business environment characterized
particularly by the positions of FP’s and JP’s intangible assets can signiﬁcantly reduce
FP’s expected ownership share in their FDI. This is consistent with the observation in
the literature that IJVs are typically unstable over time. We have also argued that at
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sample period may have been possibly the calculated consequences of the strategies
of the IJVs’ respective Japanese parent ﬁrms.
25 Ascertaining more precise role of
learning in the observed changes in the ownership of IJVs is a subject of our future
research.
Appendix A
A.1. A1. Estimating bargaining model for FDI operations: descriptive statistics
Table A1
A.2. Estimating JP’s learning from IJVs: descriptive statistics
Table A2
Appendix B. Historical background of Japan’s FDI environment and industrial
policy
In the 1950s through the 1970s all aspects of the use offoreign exchange were regulated
by Japan’s Foreign Exchange Law. The Japanese government argued their severe
restrictions on foreign exchange was necessary because of the scarcity of Japan’s foreign
exchange reserve. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), for example,
used this and other industrial policy laws to determine which companies could license
which foreign technologies for what prices under what sorts of conditions. Since full
foreign ownership was in general prohibited, foreign ﬁrms which wanted to enter the
Japanese market had to either license their technologies to Japanese ﬁrms which in turn
would produce and sell the foreign ﬁrms’ products, or to set up joint ventures with
Japanese partners so that the foreign parent’s technologies could be licensed to the joint
ventures. (IBM
26 and Texas Instruments
27 were two exceptional cases where they were
able to operate their fully owned subsidiaries in Japan.)
25 It is of interest to note that many Japanese technology-based ﬁrms now believe that a similar situation will
happen to IJVs in China in due course.
26 IBM established its fully owned subsidiary, IBM Japan, in 1937 which continued to sell IBM products in
Japan except during World War II. IBM Japan, however, was allowed to produce locally by the Japanese
government only after it agreed in 1960 to license the key patents IBM owned for the computer industry to
Japanese manufacturers. IBM Japan began local production in 1964. (Shijo, 1988.)
27 In 1964 Texas Instruments applied for a permit to set up a fully owned subsidiary in Japan to produce
semiconductors, particularly ICs. MITI rejected this application in order to protect the domestic industry. In 1967
MITI agreed to approve TI’s request for its FDI only if TI accepted the following conditions: (1) the subsidiary
must be a 50-50 joint venture with a Japanese company; (2) licensing of all the patents held by TI to Japanese
competitors; and (3) restricted production for the initial 3 years of operation after establishment (Itoh & Kiyono,
1988). In the end Sony agreed to set up this joint venture with TI in 1968. With liberalization of the government
policies, Sony was able to transfer their 50% stake in the joint venture to TI in 1971.
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Foreign Capital enacted in 1950. MITI’s decisions on technology licensing and joint
ventures were not independently made. Rather they were made based on the industrial
policies for Japan’s economic development and were implemented using the Foreign
Exchange Law and the Law Concerning Foreign Capital. Both laws favor large established
ﬁrms in what the government consider the key industries with signiﬁcant inter-ﬁrm
networks (e.g. keiretsu). This is because the Japanese government thought these types of
ﬁrms could contribute more to Japan’s foreign exchange reserve and to the development of
the industries in terms of technology and management skills (e.g. Itoh & Kiyono, 1988;
Komiya, 1988). It was then no surprise that in 1952 MITI refused to even hear Masaru
Ibuka’s request for approval of licensing of Bell Laboratories’ transistor patents owned by
Western Electric. Ibuka, working for tiny Tokyo Tsushin Kogyo (TTK) in Tokyo
(established in 1945 following World War II; subsequently renamed Sony in 1958),
became aware of the potential of transistors while on his trip to the US in 1952 and his ﬁrm
began negotiating licensing of their transistor patents with Western Electric. Even after
Western Electric agreed to license their patents to TTK for $25,000 (which was an
enormous sum for TTK), MITI, which was angry that TKK ignored MITI’s initial
rejection for licensing, continued refusing to approve the importation of the patent. Onlyin
1954 after a personnel change did MITI decide to approve the licensing and allocation of
the foreign exchange. MITI’s views were consistent: they believed that the only
companies that could contribute to the technological development of the Japanese
economy were large established ﬁrms such as Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric and Hitachi
which about the same time were approved for licensing all necessary transistor
technologies including manufacturing technologies from RCA for the price much higher
than TTK’s single patent licensing price.
In response to the development of the Japanese economy and also to the severe foreign
pressure for Japan’s trade liberalization, the Foreign Exchange Law, the Law Concerning
Foreign Capital and other laws that MITI and other government agencies used to regulate
imports of foreign technologies and foreign direct investment in general were revised
throughout the 1970s. By the early 1980s, MITI lost most of their tools for effectively
regulating technology imports and foreign direct investment. This is seen by the fact, for
example, that more IJVs began to be established for the parent ﬁrms’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc reasons
(e.g. Japanese partner tries to strengthen their weaknesses by appropriate IJVs). Mitsubishi
Motor and Caterpillar-Mitsubishi established by MHI discussed earlier are two such
examples. A more recent example is SGI Japan (Silicon Graphics (40%), NEC (40%),
NEC Software (20%)) which was set up in 1987 to develop and market SGI products. This
joint venture complements NEC’s product lines of high-performance large-scale
supercomputers, the markets of which are of strategic importance to NEC. NEC is
competing in these markets with its domestic makers such as Hitachi and Fujitsu as well as
US producers.
Finally considerably increased IP protection began to be implemented both legally and
also in terms of business practices in the 1990s during the prolonged deep recession
following the burst of the ﬁnancial bubble. The main reason for this is that many policy
makers thought the lack of adequate IP protection was in part responsible for the Japanese
economy’s loss of competitiveness in the global market. Now many ﬁrms pay much larger
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inventions. Such inventions were freely used by the ﬁrms in the past. Japanese courts are
also more sympathetic, for example, towards (both domestic and foreign) patent holders’
claims about infringements of their IP rights. (Study is yet to be done to measure the
impact of this Japanese change in policy on FDI.)
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